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I.

Introduction
This Rhode Island Sea Grant Law Fellow report was prepared for the Newport

Waterfront Commission of Newport, Rhode Island (Commission). It discusses legal and policy
issues surrounding Newport‟s boat mooring ordinances and practices. The great importance of
moorings to Newport‟s residents and tourists necessitated this report.
Moorings greatly enhance the economies of Newport and of the state of Rhode Island.
Research on Rhode Island tourism in 2006 confirmed that tourism employed 10% of Rhode
Islanders.1 This includes tourism-supported businesses, like restaurants and hotels, which
receive up to 40% of their revenue from tourism.2 Tourism in Newport is particularly dependent
on water access. A 2010 economic study concluded that “activities on the water and public
access to the water define the overall attractiveness of Newport Harbor.”3 Water-facilitated
tourism in turn contributes to the taxable sales and property values of many businesses,
especially from Newport‟s many restaurants, entertainment, and hotel businesses.4
In the United States, there is an “increased population adjacent to coastal waters [and]
tourism and recreational use…is increasing.”5 Newport is on the forefront of this national
phenomenon. The high demand for moorings is demonstrated in Newport‟s 474 applicant
waiting list, which amounts to a minimum waiting time of 10-15 years, increasing as demand
grows. 6 On the average, 10 to 15 moorings become available for new applicants each year.7
The rising numbers of registered boats, the lack of slip space, and the stress on public launching
ramps intensify the need for moorings.8 The state carries a load of 3,000 applicants waiting for
1

Kenneth McGill, How Important is Tourism to Rhode Island? 2006 Tourism Satellite Account, (Global Insight
2006), available at http://www.visitrhodeisland.com/pdf/2006_TSA_Report.pdf.
2
Id.
3
FXM Associates, The Contribution of Waterfront Land Uses to Municipal Revenues in Newport, Rhode Island
(Aug 2010), available at http://www.cityofnewport.com/departments/planning-zoning/pdf/Harbor_Summary_0806-2010.pdf.
4
Id. (“The patrons of activities and uses on the water (especially recreational boaters and excursion vessel
customers) spend considerable amounts at waterfront area businesses and, therefore, contribute to the taxable
property value and sales of commercial uses such as restaurants and retail shops”).
5
Barbara A. Vestal, Dueling with Boat Oars, Dragging through Mooring Lines: Time for More Formal Resolution
of Use Conflicts in States’ Coastal Waters? 4 Ocean & Coastal L.J. 1, 4 (1999).
6
Personal Communication with Hank Kniskern (E-mail received April 27th, 2010).
7
Id.
8
Climbing boat registration rates have exceeded other New England states and even the national average. See
Aquidneck Island Planning Commission, West Side Task Force, Aquidneck Island West Side Master Plan, Chapter
4, Planning Context, pg. 5 (2005), available at http://www.aquidneckplanning.org/westsidemast.html.
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slip space.9 The Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council has recognized these
issues, stating:
The growth in the size of the recreation fleet, limited berthing opportunities and the increasing expense of
in-water storage have contributed to rapid growth in the number of trailered boats. This has placed a heavy
demand on public launching ramps, which are in short supply and many of which are in deteriorating
10
condition or have limited parking capacity.

Given the centrality of water access to Newport‟s economy and the increasing demands it will
experience, responsible management of available mooring spaces is crucial.
This report facilitates the timely discussion of Newport‟s regulatory system for moorings
by providing background legal and policy information. One of the Commission‟s most
fundamental concerns has been understanding the Public Trust Doctrine (PTD) and its
application to boat moorings in Newport. This report addresses this concern against the
backdrop of the regulatory controls on Newport‟s decision-making in Section II. The more
specific application of public trust principles to moorings depends on two primary legal
questions: (1) the nature of the property interest a mooring holder has in his or her mooring
permit and (2) the interaction between moorings and the general public‟s right to use public trust
waters, each of which is examined in Section IV (A) and (B), respectively. Additionally, this
report explores some key specific aspects of Newport‟s mooring scheme: the commercialindividual mooring ratio; the resident-nonresident ratio; mooring underutilization; and mooring
fee profits.11

II.

Rhode Island’s Public Trust and Regulatory Framework
This section explains the principles and foundations of the PTD in the United States and

its adoption by Rhode Island. It explores the role of the doctrine in defining federal, state, and
local regulatory responsibilities. This section also serves as a background for delineating the
relationship between government actors that play a role in public trust administration.
9

Id., citing Rhode Island Marine Trades Association.
Coastal Resources Management Council, Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Program §200.3
(December, 2010), available at http://www.crmc.ri.gov/regulations/RICRMP.pdf (The Red Book).
11
Please note that the terms license and permit are used interchangeably in this report. Permit is defined as “a
certificate evidencing permission; a license.” Black‟s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). A license is defined as “a
permission, usu. revocable, to commit some act that would otherwise be unlawful…” Id.
Please also note that “commercial moorings” refers to a classification of moorings that can be used for rental
moorings. This is the official language used in the Newport mooring ordinance.
10
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The PTD was developed from the natural law principle and universal understanding that
some natural resources are so important to society that they are “incapable of individual
exclusive appropriation”.12 One of the underpinnings of the PTD is that “water, being a vital and
uncultivable resource, should be free of the monopolizing effect of private ownership.”13 In
accordance, the law developed to vest the states, rather than private parties, with title to
submerged land. The states serve as “trustees” to protect the public‟s right to use the waters
above those lands.14
In England, title to tidal water was vested in the King, to hold for the “benefit of the
nation.”15 That title had two components: “jus privitum” (the government‟s title) and “jus
publicum” (the public‟s interest, the right to use). The jus publicum created a regulatory
responsibility for the government to administer the trust in the public‟s best interest. The jus
privitum was transferred from the King to each of the original states upon the American
Revolution16 and to the remaining states upon succession.17
The United States Congress clarified that the states, rather than the federal government,
are the trust administrators when it enacted the Submerged Lands Act (SLA).18 The SLA
extends the state‟s police powers to a distance three miles from the shore, providing it with
regulatory power over its public trust waters.19 In doing so, Congress recognized that the best
way to manage public trust resources was state-by-state. Moreover, the United States Supreme
12

Berkeley v. Super. Ct. of Alameda County, 606 P.2d 362, 364 (Cal. 1980).
Mark Cheung, Comment, Dockominiums: an Expansion of Riparian Rights that Violates the Public Trust
Doctrine, 16 B.C. Envtl. Aff .L. Rev. 821, 836 (1989), citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894). See
Shively, available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/152/1/case.html. See, also, Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v.
Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 358 (Mass. 1979) (“Throughout history, the shores of the sea have been
recognized as a special form of property of unusual value and therefore subject to different legal rules from those
which apply to inland property).
14
Trustee is “one who stands in a fiduciary or confidential relation to another; esp., one who, having legal title to
property, holds it in trust for the benefit of another [the public as applied here] and owes a fiduciary duty to that
beneficiary [the public].” Black‟s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). See, also, 90 C.J.S. Trusts §1 (West 2011)
(providing a useful definition of trust as the “beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in
another”).
15
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894), available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/152/1/case.html.
16
Id. Also note that the American concept of public trust differs from the English common law in its definition of
the “ordinary high tide” line as the “edge of the sea”. Id.
17
This concept is called the “equal footing doctrine” and is explained in Shively v. Bowlby, Id. See also Black‟s
Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) (defining the equal footing doctrine as “the principle that a state admitted to the Union
after 1789 enters with the same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction within its borders as did the original 13 states.”)
18
43 U.S.C.A. § 1311 (West 2011); 43 U.S.C. § 1311, available at
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/uscode43/usc_sec_43_00001311----000-.html.
13
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Court recognized the special importance of local administration of harbors.20 The principle of
local harbor autonomy has further developed in courts throughout the United States and has been
specifically applied to moorings.21 The First Circuit Court of Appeals, which has jurisdiction
over Rhode Island, shared in this view when it held that boat user fee regulations were not preempted by any federal law.22 Thus, as a general rule, mooring regulations are largely left to state
and local governments. At the same time, the federal government is not without a limited role in
the administration of local harbors, an issue explored at the end of section II.
State and local governments have discretion in interpreting the PTD.23 The United States
Supreme Court provided a starting point for states in the development of state public trust law in
the case of Illinois Central.24 Illinois Central‟s central guidelines are “considered the foundation
of the public trust doctrine in United States law.”25 The standards in that case provide a
minimum “floor” for determining state public trust obligations.26 In other words, the state must
follow Illinois Central‟s basic protections of the public trust, but may also add an additional layer
of protection with state common law, statutes, or administrative regulations.27
19

43 U.S.C.A. § 1312 (West 2011); 43 U.S.C. § 1312, available at
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/33/usc_sec_33_00001312----000-.html.
20
Cushing v. Owners of The John Fraser, 62 U.S. 184, 187-188 (1858), available at
http://supreme.justia.com/us/62/184/case.html. See also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824), available at
http://supreme.justia.com/us/22/1/case.html.
21
“There is no reason to believe that Congress intended to occupy the field in the area of mooring” Beveridge v.
Lewis, 939 F.2d 859, 864 (9th Circ. 1991), available at http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/939/939.F2d.859.9055642.html; “anchorage and mooring are not subject areas that are particularly federally sensitive in nature” Barber
v. Hawaii Hawaiian Navigable Waters Preservation Soc‟y, 42 F.3d 1185, 1194 (9th Circ. 1994), available at
http://openjurist.org/42/f3d/1185/barber-v-state-of-hawaii-hawaiian-navigable-waters-preservation-society.
22
LCM Enter. v. Dartmouth, 14 F.3d 675, 684 (1st Circ. 1994), available at
http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/14/14.F3d.675.93-1536.html.
23
See Dennis W. Nixon, Evolution of Public and Private Rights to Rhode Island’s Shore, 24 Suffolk. U. L. Rev.
313, 327 (1999) (referring to Phillips Petroleum, “the decision appears to give states substantial flexibility in the
definition and scope of their public trust authority"). See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469
(1988), available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/484/469/index.html.
24
See Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 394 (1926) (explaining that Illinois Central “was necessarily a
statement of Illinois law” but emphasizing that the “general principle and exception [of Illinois Central] has been
recognized the country over”), available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/271/364/case.html. See Illinois Cent. R.R.
v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/146/387/.
25
Dennis W. Nixon, Evolution of Public and Private Rights to Rhode Island’s Shore, 24 Suffolk. U. L. Rev. 313,
320 (1999).
26
Crystal A. Chase, The Illinois Central Public Trust Doctrine and Federal Common Law: An Unconventional
View, 16 Hastings W.-N.W. J. Envtl. L. & Pol‟y 113, 150, 159 (2010). ( “State courts‟ use of state constitutional
provisions to articulate or expand the public trust does not run contrary to the theory of Illinois Central as grounded
in federal law. Instead, these interpretations are compatible with an understanding of Illinois Central as establishing
a federal common law “floor” limitation on state power, upon which states are free to expand using state law.”)
27
See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894), available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/152/1/case.html.
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Under Illinois Central, states can convey some property rights in public trust waters to
private parties, but the state‟s jus publicum responsibility cannot be extinguished.28 The state‟s
management of tidelands is thus unalienable.29 Proper administration of the jus publicum trust
further requires that, before granting any property interest to a private party, the government
determines (a) the conveyance is itself in furtherance of a public interest, or (b) the conveyance
has no substantial impairment to the public interest in the tidelands.30
Rhode Island‟s public trust protection closely parallels Illinois Central. The Rhode Island
Constitution incorporates the PTD in the state Constitution, explicitly recognizing the public‟s
“rights to the use and enjoyment of the natural resources of the state.” 31 While the public‟s right
to use traditionally consisted of a triad of fishing, navigation, and commercial rights32, the Rhode
Island Constitution also protects public fishing, swimming and collecting seaweed. 33
Additionally, the 1971 Rhode Island General Assembly passed a law that no absolute title
may be transferred to private parties except by explicit grant by the General Assembly after
finding such transfer consistent with public trust uses.34 With regard to leasing public trust
resources, the statute provides that before any lease of tidal land or license for exclusive use can
be granted to private parties, it must be “specifically approved for public trust purposes.”35 In
other words, it requires compatibility with the PTD. The lease compatibility determination can
be made by either the General Assembly or a designated government body.36 Because
delegation provision does not offer specific guidance with regards to moorings, it is unclear
exactly which government body is responsible for the PTD compatibility determination. The
issue is complicated by the interaction of the Coastal Resources Management Council‟s (CRMC)
regulatory authority with that of the City of Newport.
28

See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892), available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/146/387/.
Id. See also Berkeley v. Super. Ct. of Alameda County, 26 Cal.3d 515, 521, 606 P.2d 362, 365 (Cal. 1980)
(discussing Illinois Central, “the decision established the principle that a state, as administrator of the trust in
tidelands on behalf of public, does not have the power to abdicate its role as trustee in favor of private parties”).
30
Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892), available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/146/387/.
31
R.I. Const. art. I, § 17 (West 2011), available at http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/RiConstitution/C01.html. See also
Champlin‟s Realty Assoc. v. Tillson, 823 A.2d 1162, 1166 (R.I. Sup. Ct. 2003).
32
See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894), available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/152/1/case.html.
33
See R.I. Const. art. I, § 17 (West 2011), available at http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/RiConstitution/C01.html.
34
R.I. Gen. Laws § 46-5-1.2(a) (West 2011), available at http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/TITLE46/46-5/46-51.2.HTM.
35
R.I. Gen. Laws § 46-5-1.2(b) (West 2011), available at http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/TITLE46/46-5/46-51.2.HTM.
29
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The General Assembly has generally delegated all the regulatory responsibility over
coastal resources to CRMC. 37 This delegation makes CRMC the administrator of Rhode
Island‟s public trust waters.38 Thus, the agency serves as the “principle mechanism for
management of the state‟s coastal resources.”39 One exception to CRMC‟s “exclusive
jurisdiction”40 over coastal resources is that the General Assembly specifically delegated the
mooring licensing authority to certain harbor cities. 41 Accordingly, Newport has been delegated
the power to determine the number, placement, and use of permanent and temporary moorings,
the assignment and removal of moorings, minimum mooring specifications, and fees.42 Newport
exercises this power through the city ordinances and enforcement by the harbormaster. Just as
the CRMC‟s enabling statute placed the agency in “the role of public trustee for the state‟s
coastal resources,”43 Newport is required to comply with the PTD when administering its
mooring ordinances.44
Because CRMC retains jurisdiction over non-mooring aspects of Newport Harbor, the
interaction between the two government entities is important. CRMC‟s governance overlaps
with Newport‟s in two respects: (1) the requirement of CRMC approval for Harbor Management
Plans, and (2) jurisdiction over permits that include moorings plus other uses, activities, or
structures that are outside the scope Newport‟s jurisdiction. The City of Newport is therefore
required to have a CRMC-approved Municipal Harbor Management Plan in order to ensure
36

R.I. Gen. Laws § 46-5-1.2(b) (West 2011), available at http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/TITLE46/46-5/46-51.2.HTM.
37
R.I. Gen. Laws § 46-23-6 (West 2011), available at http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/Title46/46-23/46-236.HTM
38
Dennis W. Nixon, Evolution of Public and Private Rights to Rhode Island’s Shore, 24 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 313,
323-324 (1990) (explaining that CRMC “clearly assumed the role of public trustee for the state‟s coastal
resources”).
39
Coastal Resources Management Council, Ocean Special Area Management Plan § 1020.1(3) (October 19, 2010),
available at http://www.crmc.ri.gov/samp_ocean/finalapproved/RI_Ocean_SAMP.pdf.
40
Coastal Resources Management Council, Ocean Special Area Management Plan 1020.1 (3) (October 19, 2010),
available at http://www.crmc.ri.gov/samp_ocean/finalapproved/RI_Ocean_SAMP.pdf.
41
See, e.g. R.I. Gen. Laws § 46-4-6.6 (West 2011) (Newport), available at
http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/TITLE46/46-4/46-4-6.6.HTM.
42
Id.
43
Dennis W. Nixon, Evolution of Public and Private Rights to Rhode Island’s Shore, 24 Suffolk. U. L. Rev. 313,
321 (1999).
44
See The Public Trust Doctrine, Striking a Balance Between Public and Private Rights in the Shore, pg. 12. (June
4, 1999, Roger Williams University Ralph R. Papitto School of Law, Bristol, RI) (“A state may still delegate to local
governments the responsibility and authority for administering Trust resources. Such delegations may take the form
of local shoreland zoning, and port and harbor management.”). See also Champlain‟s Reality Assoc. v. Tillson, 2001
WL 770810, at *5 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2001).
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compatibility with the Coastal Resources Management Program (a.k.a. the “Red Book”). 45
CRMC has emphasized this by expressing that the harbor cities‟ power is limited by the agency‟s
approval of the location of the proposed mooring permitting areas.46 The plan approval program
was developed to facilitate the positive interaction of municipalities with the CRMC: “[w]hile
the primary responsibility for developing and implementing harbor management remains at the
local level, regulations to ensure that actions taken by the municipalities are consistent with the
overriding management programs are reserved by the state.”47 The CRMC‟s April 2010
approval of the City of Newport‟s Comprehensive Harbor Management Plan (Harbor Plan)
indicates that Newport‟s mooring scheme is in compliance with CRMC‟s regulations and
consistent with its purposes.
When permittees seek approval for projects that involve both moorings and CRMCregulated elements, CRMC retains jurisdiction over the entire project and Newport loses
authority over those moorings.48 For example, an operation that includes moorings plus docks,
floats, and/or a floating business would be outside of Newport‟s jurisdiction.49 If the permits for
the elements under exclusive CRMC jurisdiction were denied, however, Newport would resume
jurisdiction over the remaining moorings.50 Due to these intersections with CRMC jurisdiction,
Newport has exclusive jurisdiction over moorings only under two conditions: (1) it is acting
pursuant to a CRMC-approved Harbor Plan, and (2) the applicant seeks a mooring only.
In order to best exercise the power to issue mooring permits, the Newport City Council
has created the Commission, which serves to “recommend areas to be designated for anchorages
and moorings, as well as suggested rules and regulations governing the placement and
administration of assigned moorings.”51 The Newport City Council considers the Commission‟s
recommendations in enacting Harbor Rules and Regulations by city ordinance.52
45

Coastal Resources Management Council, Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Program § 300.15
(December, 2010), available at http://www.crmc.ri.gov/regulations/RICRMP.pdf (The Red Book).
46
Coastal Resources Management Council, Management Procedures for Siting Mooring Areas, pg. 1 (May 20,
2006), available at http://www.crmc.ri.gov/regulations/Mooring_Fields_Siting.pdf.
47
R.I. Admin. Code 16-1-13-B (West 2010).
48
Miner v. Newport, 1988 WL 1017203, *3 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1988) (a.k.a. Bolender case).
49
Id.
50
See Miner, Id. at 5 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1988).
51
Newport Code of Ordinances 2.88.030(D), available at
http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=16524&stateId=39&stateName=Rhode Island.
52
Id. at 12.28.130.
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Therefore, Newport generally enjoys autonomy from the federal government in its harbor
management responsibilities, but remains subject to CRMC‟s oversight of the Newport‟s Harbor
Management Plan. While the General Assembly specifically delegated Newport the power to
regulate moorings, this authority is subject to the statutory requirement of PTD compatibility.
Newport‟s administration of its mooring scheme is also guided by Illinois Central, the United
State Supreme Court‟s articulation of the minimum requirements for public trust administrators.
Under Illinois Central, Newport may issue mooring permits only if it retains regulatory control
and determines that the permits either advance a public trust interest or have a minimal negative
impact on the general public‟s right to use public trust waters.53
Note: Federal Role
While Newport and CRMC share significant regulatory authority over moorings, there
are several federal restrictions on that authority. First, because mooring equipment are
permanent “structures” in navigable water under the Rivers and Harbors Act54, the state must act
pursuant to its General Permit from the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Army Corps).55
Second, moorings that are within “federal project areas”56 may be subject to Army Corps‟
guidance policies. However, Newport is seeking to redefine the boundaries of the federal project
areas.57
Third, state and local regulatory power is subject to the federal navigational servitude.
The navigational servitude is defined as "an aspect of the sovereignty of the United States,
grounded in the power of the Federal Government to regulate commerce, entitling the
government to exert a dominant servitude in all lands below the ordinary high water mark of
53

See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892), available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/146/387/.
33 C.F.R. § 322.3(a) (West 2011) (“DA permits are required under section 10 for structures and/or work in or
affecting navigable waters of the United States”), available at http://law.justia.com/cfr/title33/333.0.1.1.28.0.10.3.html; 33 C.F.R. § 322.2(b) (West 2011), available at http://cfr.vlex.com/vid/322-2-definitions19766543 (The term structure shall include, without limitation, any pier, boat dock, boat ramp, wharf, dolphin, weir,
boom, breakwater, bulkhead, revetment, riprap, jetty, artificial island, artificial reef, permanent mooring structure,
power transmission line, permanently moored floating vessel, piling, aid to navigation, or any other obstacle or
obstruction). These regulations are enacted pursuant to the Army Corps‟ authority to promulgate 33 U.S.C.A. § 403,
available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/33/403.html.
55
Department of the Army, Programmatic General Permit, State of Rhode Island, General Permit No. NAE-20062711 (February 13, 2007), available at http://www.nae.usace.army.mil/reg/Permits/RI_PGP.pdf.
56
Map No. 3 in the Newport Waterfront Commission, City of Newport Comprehensive Harbor Management Plan
(April 2010).
54
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navigable streams.”58 This means the federal government has a paramount interest in protecting
interstate travel and business. If commerce is being impaired in state waters, the federal
government will override the usual policy of giving local authorities autonomy over harbor
management and step in to protect commerce. The superior power vested in the navigational
servitude gives the federal government authority to make laws pre-empting any interfering state
or local regulation. The United States Supreme Court may also overrule any state court decision
deemed inconsistent with the federal navigational servitude. While the Harbor Plan does
indicate that the moorings may have some effect on navigation, this issue is beyond the scope of
this report.59
Finally, parts of Newport Harbor are currently designated federal “anchorage grounds”60
and federal “special anchorage areas.”61 These areas are subject to Coast Guard regulations
unrelated to the mooring issues discussed in this report.62

III.

Statutory Compliance of Newport’s Mooring Regulations

In administering its mooring regulations, Newport is subject to both federal and state
statutes. The Rivers and Harbors Act applies to Newport‟s moorings through its grant of
authority to Army Corps to issue General Permits to harbor municipalities. Under Rhode Island
57

Newport Waterfront Commission, City of Newport Comprehensive Harbor Management Plan, pg. 101 (April
2010).
58
78 Am. Jur. 2d Waters §137 (West 2010).
59
For example, the issue of moorings experiencing vessel drifting over the federal navigation channel is mentioned
on page 102 of the Harbor Management Plan.
60
Federal Anchorage D is located west of Goat Island and lying between Rose Island to its north and Ft. Adams to
its south. Newport Waterfront Commission, City of Newport Comprehensive Harbor Management Plan, pg. 101
(April 2010). Federal Anchorage E is located north of the Point Mooring Area going north to the southerly shore of
Coasters Harbor Island. HMP pg. 105. The official coordinate descriptions are set forth at 33 C.F.R. § 110.145,
available at http://cfr.vlex.com/vid/110-145-narragansett-bay-19758708.
61
Area No.1 is in Brenton Cove. Area No. 2 is east of Goat Island. Area No. 3 is north of the Goat Island
Causeway Bridge beginning at the Newport Harbor Light following the southerly boundary of Anchorage E to the
shoreline, south along the shoreline to the east foot of the Goat Island Causeway Bridge, west following the Goat
Island Causeway Bridge to the shoreline of Goat Island, north following the east shore of Goat Island to the point of
beginning. 33 C.F.R. § 110.46 (West 2011), available at http://cfr.vlex.com/vid/110-46-newport-harbor-19758249.
62
For the Coast Guard regulations regarding boat traffic in anchorage grounds, see 33 C.F.R. § 109.05, available at
http://cfr.vlex.com/vid/109-05-anchorage-grounds-19757933. For the Coast Guard regulations regarding boat traffic
in these special anchorage areas, see 33 C.F.R. § 109.10, available at http://cfr.vlex.com/vid/109-10-specialanchorage-areas-19757949.
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law, municipalities must also meet the PTD compatibility requirement explained in subsection B,
below.
A. Compliance with Rhode Island’s Army Corps General Permit
Federal law requires a permit from the Army Corps to place any physical structure,
including mooring tackle, in navigable waters.63 Rhode Island municipalities have Army Corps‟
permission to allow private parties to place mooring equipment within their jurisdiction, subject
to the conditions provided in Rhode Island General Permit.64 The Permit expressly allows
“private, non-commercial, non-rental, single-boat moorings” that are cited pursuant to a CRMCapproved Harbor Plan. 65 The general permit requires Army Corps approval for any moorings
that do meet that description. 66
Unless the area is de-authorized, it may be advisable to recognize Army Corps
jurisdiction in Newport‟s ordinance. This could be accomplished by indicating that Newport‟s
commercial mooring permits are subject to Army Corps approval. Sample language can be
found in Jamestown‟s ordinance: “New applicants for commercial mooring permits in harbor
waters must be approved by the [CRMC], the Army Corps of Engineers, and the harbor
commission.”67
B. The PTD Compatibility Requirement
As discussed in Section II, the 2000 General Assembly set forth two different standards
for state disposition and leasing of public trust resources. R.I. Gen. Laws § 46-5-1.2 has two
important provisions:
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33 C.F.R. § 322.2(b) (West 2011), available at http://cfr.vlex.com/vid/322-2-definitions-19766543.
Department of the Army, Programmatic General Permit, State of Rhode Island, General Permit No. NAE-20062711 (February 13, 2007), available at http://www.nae.usace.army.mil/reg/Permits/RI_PGP.pdf.
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Id. See also, Maine Harbormasters Association, Harbor Management, A Legal Guide for Harbormasters and
Coastal Officials, available at http://www.maineharbormasters.org/Harbor%20Management.htm (Maine‟s general
permit has the same restriction, leading the MHA report to conclude: “rental moorings are not included under the
permit. As a result, marina operators and others who plan to lease moorings must obtain a permit from the Corps.”)
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Department of the Army, Programmatic General Permit, State of Rhode Island, General Permit No. NAE-20062711 (February 13, 2007), available at http://www.nae.usace.army.mil/reg/Permits/RI_PGP.pdf.
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Jamestown Code of Ordinances, Ch. 78, Art. II, Div. 4, Sec. 6(e), available at
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(a) Before absolute title to public trust waters may be transferred to private parties, the
General Assembly must first make a PTD compatibility determination.68
(b) When a more limited property interest is involved (i.e. a lease), the statute still requires a
PTD compatibility determination, but provides that the duty to make the determination
may be delegated to another government entity.69
The first standard requires a PTD compatibility determination by the General Assembly itself.
The General Assembly has made a PTD compatibility determination for “recreational mooring
areas.”70 The General Assembly left CRMC the responsibility of further defining approved
“recreational moorings.”71 CRMC in turn defined “recreational moorings areas” as “any
designated area managed by a commercial enterprise, a club, a city, or town, where five (5) or
more recreational craft are kept at moorings.”72 Newport‟s private mooring areas fall within the
category definition as moorings managed by a city. The city‟s commercial moorings also appear
to meet the scope of the legislative consistency determination as moorings “managed by a
commercial enterprise,” but remain subject to the Newport‟s regulatory authority.
Under the second provision, applicable to leases, the PTD compatibility determination
may be made by either the legislature or by the appropriate government delegate. However, the
General Assembly has not addressed whether CRMC or Newport is the delegate in this situation.
While it is clear that CRMC is generally the agency to which the administration of public trust
waters has been designated,73 administration of moorings in particular has been delegated to
Newport.74 It is unclear whether (a) the delegation of mooring authority also delegates the PTD
compatibility determination to Newport, or (b) CRMC‟s more general public trust delegation
controls.
Under the former interpretation, Newport has the responsibility of deciding whether the
mooring scheme is consistent with the PTD. This decision would be informed by Illinois
Central. The analysis of the mooring scheme under the principles of Illinois Central is explored
68

R.I. Gen. Laws § 46-5-1.2(a), available at http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/TITLE46/46-5/46-5-1.2.HTM.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 46-5-1.2(b), available at http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/TITLE46/46-5/46-5-1.2.HTM.
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Id.
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Coastal Resources Management Council, Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Program § 300.4
(December, 2010), available at http://www.crmc.ri.gov/regulations/RICRMP.pdf (The Red Book).
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R.I. Gen. Laws § 46-23-6, , available at http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/Title46/46-23/46-23-6.HTM
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in section IV of this report. The latter interpretation may be more consistent with CRMC‟s
views. The CRMC‟s has articulated its position that municipalities empowered by statute to
regulate moorings are not “specifically empowered to consider environmental impacts of
activists, prevention of conflicts with other water dependent uses, or to decide resource
allocation questions” (emphasis supplied).75 Because a PTD compatibility determination
requires balancing the benefit of moorings with other public use interests, it might be construed
as a “resource allocation question” outside Newport‟s scope of authority.
There are two indications that CRMC has made or would make the requisite
compatibility determination with regard to Newport‟s private and commercial moorings. When
CRMC defined “recreational mooring area” for purposes of delineating the scope of the
legislature‟s categorical PTD compatibility determination, it specifically contemplated moorings
managed by the city (private moorings) and those managed by a commercial enterprise
(commercial moorings). CRMC‟s approval of Newport‟s HMP may also be construed as a
manifestation of CRMC‟s views on the PTD compatibility issue. Assuming that the CRMC
acted pursuant to its “role of public trustee for the state‟s coastal resources,”76 the agency would
not have approved any provisions of the HMP that the agency deemed inconsistent with the
PTD.
IV.

Public Trust Doctrine Applied to Newport’s Mooring Regulations
The application of the PTD to Newport‟s mooring scheme includes two important

inquires under Illinois Central: (A) the nature of the interest conveyed to the mooring holder and
the nature of the regulatory power retained by the city, and (B) whether the private moorings are
in the public interest or have a minimalistic effect on that interest, discussed in turn below in
subsections A and B, respectively.
A. The Nature of the Property Interest Conveyed by a Mooring Permit
In examining the nature of the property interest conveyed by a Newport mooring permit,
this section provides three ways to assess property rights. The first inquiry is the conveyance of
the right to exclude others. The public trust significance of this inquiry is the degree to which
74

R.I. Gen. Laws § 46-4-6.6, available at http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/TITLE46/46-4/46-4-6.6.HTM.
R.I. Admin. Code 16-1-13-B (West 2010).
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Dennis W. Nixon, Evolution of Public and Private Rights to Rhode Island’s Shore, 24 Suffolk. U. L. Rev. 313,
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moorings interfere with non-permittees‟ use and enjoyment of public trust waters. The second
question centers around the revocability of the property interest. The final aspect of the property
interest analysis is the issue of mooring alienability (i.e. the right to dispose of the property right
by sale or deed). The public trust significance of the latter two inquiries depends on the inverse
relationship between the scope of the property interest conveyed and the scope of the
management authority the City retained.
Before this analysis, it is important to note the distinctions between commercial moorings
and private moorings under Newport‟s ordinances. These differences inform the characterization
of the property interests involved. Private moorings are designated for use by the boat registered
to that mooring.77 Commercial moorings are defined in the Newport mooring ordinance as “any
mooring which does not meet the definition of a private mooring.”78
The most significant difference between private and commercial moorings is that
commercial moorings may be rented to third parties. In fact, that is their primary purpose. In
contrast, the private mooring lessee is strictly forbidden from subleasing the mooring space.79 In
fact, an attempt to do so will result in forfeiture of the license.80 Newport‟s policy is to place
heavy restrictions on use by vessels not registered to the mooring in order to ensure that the
private moorings are not being unlawfully used in a commercial manner for rental profit.
Therefore, while the private lessee may allow another vessel to occupy the mooring space for up
to 7 days at a time not exceeding 14 total days per year, such use must be (a) approved by the
harbormaster in writing, and (b) not be compensated, i.e. not produce profit for the mooring
holder.81 The other circumstance in which a non-registered boat could occupy the mooring space
is by rafting.82 The limitations on the use of rafting in the Newport ordinances is that (a) it shall
“not interfere with adjacent single moorings or anchorages,” (b) the rafted boat needs to be
manned at all times,83 and (c) the lessee cannot receive compensation from the rafted boat.84
77

Newport Code of Ordinances 12.28.130(C)(2)(g); 12.28.130(D)(3), available at
http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=16524&stateId=39&stateName=Rhode Island.
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Id. at 12.28.130(B)(8).
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Id. at 12.28.130(F)(4).
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Id.
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Id. at 12.28.130(F)(4) and 12.28.130(D)(3).
82
Id. at 12.28.130(M).
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Id.
84
Id. at 12.28.130(D)(3).
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With regard to commercial moorings, however, Newport retains relatively less regulatory
control.
1. Right to Exclude
The right to exclude others has been described as the most important right in the bundle
of property rights.85 Newport‟s mooring permits give the permittee the right and perhaps even
the responsibility to exclude other boats from using the mooring space registered to them.
Because this results in the exclusion of the general public from mooring areas, the property
interest in exclusion directly relates to the Illinois Central inquiry into the degree that the
property interest conveyed interferes with the general public‟s use and enjoyment of public trust
waters. That question is explored further in subsection B below.
2. License Revocability
Mooring permits are subject to regulatory conditions that warrant revocation. These include
aspects of the Newport mooring ordinance such as a valid Rhode Island boat registration,
mooring tackle specifications, boat size limits, and the registration sticker system. Because the
mooring license is revocable if the licensee fails to comply with any of these conditions, the right
to use and possess the mooring space is not absolute. In this respect, the mooring permits more
closely resemble a preferred right to access the water than a vested property interest. CRMC
explicitly recognized the license nature of all mooring permits, clarifying that any activities
carried out pursuant to approved Harbor Management Plans “shall be considered to be acting
under license from the State of Rhode Island.” 86
A revocable license is in stark contrast to the conveyance condemned in Illinois Central.87
That case involved a transfer of absolute title in fee simple to a private party. In contrast,
Newport‟s mooring scheme conveys a revocable license. The United States Supreme Court has
made this distinction between impermissible fee simple transfers and the permissible revocable
licenses in the dock permit context.88
85

63C Am. Jur. 2d Property § 1 (West 2011) (The right to exclude others, as well as their property, is one of the
most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.)
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R.I. Admin. Code 16-1-13-B (West 2010).
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See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892), available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/146/387/.
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Id.
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The public trust significance of limiting the scope of a licensee‟s property interest arises
from the relationship between rights conveyed and management responsibilities retained. This
retention of management responsibility is a key requirement under Illinois Central. Private
moorings are more consistent with Illinois Central due to the additional regulatory restrictions on
the use of the mooring by unregistered boats. In this respect, Newport retains more control over
private moorings than over commercial mooring. Therefore, private moorings, having more
restrictions, receive a more circumscribed property interest than do commercial moorings.
In addition to limiting the scope of the property interest for public trust purposes,
revocability has legal significance under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment,89 as
incorporated against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.90 The Takings Clause requires
the state to compensate a private property interest holder if the state either takes away, physically
intrudes on, or enacts regulations render the property interest economically valueless.91 But with
regard to Newport‟s mooring, a licensee is put on notice that his or her license is revocable.
Thus, if a private or commercial license is revoked, the City does not have to compensate the
permit holder, because the permittee never had a reasonable expectation of continued use in the
first place. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has explained that “permits to perform
activities on public land…are mere licenses whose revocation cannot rise to the level of a 5th
amendment taking.” 92 This conclusion would apply with equal force to licenses to use public
trust water.
3. Alienability
Alienability of a property interest refers to the right to dispose, which means the ability of
the owner to sell or deed the property interest.93 In Newport, the right to dispose of private
moorings is limited to a transfer to a family member.94 In the case of moorings registered to a
89

U.S. Const. amend. V, available at http://topics.law.cornell.edu/constitution/billofrights#amendmentv
See, e.g. Missouri v. Nebraska, 196 U.S. 23 (1904), available at
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=196&invol=23.
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See, e.g. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), available at
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Marine One v. Manatee County, 898 F.2d 1490, 1492-1493 (11th Circ. 1990), available at
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natural person, this limitation is easily enforced. With respect to private moorings registered to
partnerships, LLCs, or corporations, however, application of the transfer limit provision is less
straight-forward. Under a strict interpretation, business entities may never transfer private
moorings because they do not have any family members. While the partners, members, or
shareholders no doubt have family members, the business entity is recognized as a legally
separate property owner.95 This means that the property of the business entity, the mooring
permit in this case, is not the property of the natural persons that belong to that business
organization. This strict construction is consistent with business organization law, which
punishes natural person representatives who disregard business formality by treating business
assets as their own.96
With regard to commercial moorings, the ordinances do not explicitly prohibit
transferring the mooring by deed or sale. While the ordinance‟s intent to allow renting out
commercial moorings is clear, the ordinance thus leaves the question of alienability unanswered.
Furthermore, because of the concept of separate legal identity, both private and
commercial moorings held by business associations may change natural person ownership
without any “transfer” action. Because LLCs and corporations can change ownership hands
without any alteration to its business identity,97 one interpretation of the ordinance is that
moorings could be transferred between private parties into perpetuity.
The public trust significance of alienability is that it results in transfer of a much broader
property interest. As noted in subsection 2, the broader the property interest conveyed, the less
regulatory authority the City of Newport has retained. Therefore, commercial moorings, without
further limits introduced into the ordinance revision, are less consistent with the principles of
Illinois Central.
Ordinance Recommendation: Clarifying the Property Interest Conveyed

of ordinance review is to revise the ordinance to comply with CRMC guidelines stipulating only one transfer.
Personal Communication with Hank Kniskern (E-mail received April 27th, 2010).
95
See, generally, NTS Am. Jur. 2d Limited Liability Companies § 1 (West 2011), 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership §
246 (West 2011), 18 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 44(West 2011).
96
18 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 46 (West 2011).
97
See Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn, 210 U.S. 206, 216 (1908), citing Donnell v.
Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co. 208 U. S. 267, 273 (1908) (“ a corporation remains unchanged and unaffected in its
identity by changes in its members”). These cases are available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/210/206/ and
http://supreme.justia.com/us/208/267/case.html, respectively.
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Like any property license, Newport‟s mooring permits “can be revoked at the pleasure of
the licensor, regardless of how long the use has been permitted.”98 Because mooring permits are
often renewed across a long period of time, it may be beneficial to highlight the notion of
revocability despite the length of time one holds a permit. While permittees do not have an
absolute legal right of ownership, the length of time one holds a permit does increase the
permittee‟s expectation that the right will not be forfeited. The tension created by such
expectations might be eased by further clarification in the ordinance or within the documents
issued to mooring applicants and permittees.
Thus, it may be beneficial to add a clarification that the mooring permit does not (a) carry
absolute property rights, (b) provide for a term longer than one year, and (c) is revocable if the
harbormaster reasonably finds a violation. In Maine, for example, “recent amendments clarify
that a grant of the privilege to set a mooring does not carry with it any property rights to state
owned submerged lands occupied by the mooring.”99 The Maine Harbormasters Association‟s
Harbor Management Guide explains that the amendments “should bar claims that the state has in
any way conveyed away public trust lands.”100 This could also bar claims against the city for
any damages related to a forfeiture decision based on takings claims explained in section
IV(A)(2) of this report.
Newport may also benefit from adopting the Massachusetts term “temporary mooring,”
which is used in the state‟s legislation to describe its mooring permits, defining temporary as “no
longer than to the end of any given calendar year.”101 This phraseology emphasizes the fact that
the mooring permit holder does not have any vested property interest in the mooring beyond one
year.
B. Compatibility of Moorings with the Public’s Interest
The second issue arising under Illinois Central is whether the moorings are consistent
with the purposes of the PTD. The PTD is satisfied if the property interest transferred (a) is in
98

53 C.J.S. Licenses § 43 (West 2010).
Maine Harbormasters Association, Harbor Management, A Legal Guide for Harbormasters and Coastal Officials,
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furtherance of the public interest, or (b) has a minimal impact on the public‟s use of the
resource.102 But which government unit decides this? Because Illinois Central does not answer
the question, the matter is left entirely to state law.
Under the statute codifying the public trust doctrine in Rhode Island, the General
Assembly must make the decision about whether an absolute ownership interest may be
transferred to a private party.103 Some other states have also vested their legislative branches
with the power and duty to administer public trust waters.104 On the other hand, some states
have deemed it poor policy to leave the PTD in the hands of the legislature. One court went so
far as to conclude: “[w]e find the concept of stewardship inconsistent with the function of the
Legislature.”105 The concern is that legislatures act too broadly by declaring that an entire
category of uses is consistent with the public trust doctrine, without regard to the important local
variables. While legislative sessions focus on general policies, case-by-case adjudication looks
at the facts underlying the particular property interest and its impact on public trust uses. The
degree of impact of permitted activities on public trust uses varies based on the time, place, and
the manner of those existing and proposed uses.
Under Rhode Island‟s public trust law, either the legislative branch or the relevant
delegate determines whether a transfer of a limited property interest (i.e. a license) is consistent
with the PTD. As explained in Section III in this report, there is a question as to whether the
relevant delegate for mooring PTD compatibility determinations is CRMC or the Commission.
Some states have delegated public trust administration to administrative agencies106 like CRMC,
while other states have delegated the responsibility to local government units,107 like the
102
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Commission. Without deciding where the delegation lies in Rhode Island, the information in this
section is intended to inform the Commission‟s own consideration of PTD compatibility.
1. In Furtherance of the “Public Interest”?
The “public interest” language used in Illinois Central is different from the usual
pronouncement that the state holds title in trust for the “public use.” However, the Supreme
Court did not further explain what it meant by “public interest.” One interpretation is that it is a
restatement of the purpose of the trust for preserving traditional public uses. The other
interpretation depends on a broader understanding of the public‟s interests, which extends
beyond actual use of public trust waters.
a. Traditional Public Trust Uses
The PTD traditionally protects navigation, commerce, and fishing.108 It is clear that the
PTD is violated if a property interest transferred to a private party results in substantial
interference with the general public‟s ability to use the resource for those purposes. But it is not
clear from Illinois Central the degree to which any transfer should go beyond non-interference
and actually further the public‟s use of the area.
Moorings enhance enjoyment for certain boat-owners. Moorings allow permittees to
access the water more conveniently than access by public boat ramp. Some permittees use the
moored vessel for recreational fishing. The commercial moorings are a source of revenue for
commercial lessees. For non-permittees, however, moorings do not further actual use for the
general public. Neither do Newport moorings further the additional Rhode Island Constitution
guarantees of gathering of seaweed, leaving the shore to swim in the area, and passage along the
shore.109 However, none of these benefits to traditional public trust uses are shared by the public
as a whole.
It is uncertain under the PTD whether the mooring system is benefiting enough of the
general public to be considered as promoting public trust uses. However, any project designed
for the general public will necessarily exclude some people at the same time. For example, a
“public trust” duties provided that the delegation is in furtherance of the trust and will not block the advancement of
paramount interests”), available at
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2705054096608551323&q=271+N.W.2d+69+&hl=en&as_sdt=2,40.
108
See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894), available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/152/1/case.html.
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public beach will accommodate visitors from the general public, but the number could be limited
in order to provide for a safe visitor-to-lifeguard ratio without offending the PTD. The Supreme
Court of California provided another example when it upheld one municipality‟s decision lease
tidal areas to a packing, processing, and shipping warehouse, calling it a “public use in
furtherance of the trust for navigation and commerce.”110 The fact that the plant would not
accommodate every member of the public did not prevent a finding that it provided for overall
promotion of traditional public trust uses.
Furthermore, while the mooring scheme inevitably enhances the use of certain members
of the public to the exclusion of others, the alternative of unregulated moorings is unworkable.
Allowing unrestricted mooring would greatly hinder safety and navigation throughout the harbor
to the detriment of not some, but all, members of the public. While the system is, like any
regulatory scheme, not perfect, Newport strives to reach an equitable balance between the need
to limit use and the desire to expand use to more of the general public by using an open public
allocation process. The extent to which private use of mooring space to select private parties
reduces the area of the harbor usable by general public is discussed in subsection 2 below.
b. Broader Public Interest Test
The inquiry into the more general public interest of moorings considers benefits outside
of the traditional public trust purposes. The United States Supreme Court stated that, in addition
to the promotion of interstate and international commerce, a state could transfer interests in
public trust areas for the purpose of performing international obligations or for “other public
purposes.”111 For example, benefits to the public might include “increasing tax revenues” or
“[putting] property to a commercial use.”112
The question of whether the mooring scheme puts public property into private hands for a
broader “public use” may be informed by cases dealing with the “public use” test in a different
109
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legal context. For example, in an eminent domain context,113 the Rhode Island Supreme Court
explained that there are two categories of appropriate “public uses”: (1) “where the public use is
direct and obvious,” and (2) where “the public necessity is so direct and obvious as to imply a
public use.”114
The first category satisfying the public interest includes uses such as highways, parks,
drainage systems, which the public directly uses. In evaluating public interest of a marina and
auditorium operation by the Newport Development Authority, the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island responded that the facility could not be leased “to private persons to be operated for
private purposes and profit.” 115 But the court construed the auditorium as satisfying public
purpose, with the limitation that it “must be devoted primarily to a use by or service to the public
and not to any private use, unless the latter be merely incidental and reasonably related to the
proper public use and be productive of revenue for the public.”116 While the court thus
recognized that a private use may benefit the public by production of tax revenue, it required that
the private use be incidental. Thus, while the mooring revenues are dedicated to harbor
development projects that do benefit the entire public, the wholly private use by mooring
permittees is more than incidental under this test.117
While raising revenue through tourism benefits Newport‟s residents, it is not enough
under a strict public use test. However, Newport‟s mooring scheme may be distinguished from a
general revenue raising scheme. The use of the Maritime Enterprise Fund (MEP) ensures that
the revenues are expended for specific harbor purposes, including projects that greatly improve
the general public‟s use of the harbor. The benefits of the MEP are explored further in section
VIII of this report.
The “public necessity” category covers uses such as repair and storage facilities that are
necessary for the continuance of an established public use such as a railroad. The relevant
question is whether moorings are reasonably necessary to facilitate recreational boating. If so,
113
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the mooring scheme is consistent with other jurisdictions‟ use of the PTD to facilitate
recreational use of water resources.118 The Rhode Island Supreme Court explained that uses
falling outside these two categories are not “public uses.” The court explained that “there are
many kinds of business of great benefit to the public” that are not for the “public use.”119
While the moorings do not fall neatly within the “public use” categories or clearly
without it, the inquiry is not a static one. It is important to remember the ever-changing nature of
the public use inquiry. The Rhode Island Supreme Court does not give public use a “rigid,
unbending, absolute definition,” instead highlighting the “ever-changing conditions of our
modern society, new advances in the fields of science, new concepts in the scope and function of
government and other circumstances.”120 An interest in developing the tourism industry has
been recognized by at least some courts. The Supreme Court of Mississippi, for example, held
that allowing a development that would benefit commerce and tourism was “consistent with the
public trust,” stating the private ownership aspect of the development alone did “not negative the
comprehensive public purpose.”121
In summary, the following facts bear most directly on the public use and interest inquiry.
Newport‟s mooring scheme facilitates public trust uses for permittees. The system necessarily
limits the number of individuals who can enjoy the use-facilitating permits, but does so by an
open public allocation process. Non-permittees benefit from the mooring scheme only insomuch
as the fees are used for harbor projects, the use of which may be enjoyed by a greater segment of
the general public.
2. Minimal Impact on the Public’s Use?
Another inquiry under Illinois Central is whether the conveyance is so minimal as to not
constitute any interference with the public‟s use.122 Some jurisdictions have focused this inquiry
on the percentage of the resource that is being allocated to private parties. For example, while
the Supreme Court of California held that 40% of public trust waters could not be granted to
118
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private parties,123 a California appellate court found that a grant of 1.6% constituted a “relatively
small parcel.”124 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin considered the fact that “the
diminution of [the public trust area] will be very small when compared with the whole of [the
public trust area].”125
In Newport, the permitted moorings are located in designated areas that total 245 acres.126
The ordinance provides that 25% of mooring permits may be issued as commercial moorings.
Correlated to the area, it is useful to think of the commercial mooring as occupying around 60
acres of the Harbor, closing off those 60 acres from public and recreational use. Of course, the
relationship between the number of mooring permits and the occupied mooring area is direct, but
not proportional. It might be useful to contrast this number with the larger area (1000 acres)
stuck down as violating of the public trust doctrine by the US Supreme Court in Illinois
Central127 and the area of the “relatively small parcel[s]” upheld by the California Supreme Court
(18 acres in one case128; 10.6 in another129).
Another way of approaching the issue is to look at the percentage being granted as proxy
for impairment of the public‟s use of the resource. In other words, some courts look at the
percentage in order to aid the ultimate determination of whether the conveyance has impaired the
public‟s enjoyment of the public trust resource. For example, in evaluating the “impediment to
full use of the public trust resource,” the Supreme Court of Idaho looks at the portion of the
water body “taken up by docks, moorings or other impediments.” This fact-based inquiry is
resolved if “no one of the public uses of [the public trust resource] will be destroyed or greatly
impaired.130 The survey of Newport Harbor consumers contained in the HMP contains many
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comments on Newport‟s moorings. However, none refer to any interference with fishing,
navigation, or any of the other Rhode Island Constitution uses.131

V.

Private: Commercial Mooring Ratio
CRMC has recognized the need to “balance between commercial and non-commercial

uses” in designating moorings.132 Newport has decided to set its balance between private and
commercial moorings at a ratio of 3:1.133 This restricts the number of commercial moorings to
no more than 25% of the total leased moorings.134
Despite the 25% limit provided in the ordinance, 32% of the total moorings in Newport
are currently registered as commercial.135 This figure does not include any private moorings that
are being misused as rental moorings, but Newport has made prevention of such use a priority
for the harbor.136 The harbormaster works to enjoin licensees of private moorings from
unlawfully sub-leasing. This protects Newport from being deprived of increased fee revenue and
from distortion of the ordinance‟s commercial/private ratio.
The current ordinance also has a provision that allows private mooring lessees to apply
for re-designation as a commercial mooring.137 Newport should consider how this will alter the
ratio. For example, it might be prudent to add a clarification in the ordinance that such
application can be made only at such time as the commercial mooring percentage is reduced
below 25%. The ordinance is silent as to prioritizing between persons on the new commercial
mooring waiting list and those on the re-designation list. Newport may wish to consider
addressing, through the ordinance, the preference, if any, to those who seek re-designation or
clarifying that all applicants for commercial mooring permits, irrespective of previous or current
licensee status, are placed in a common pool.
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Decisions about allocating between new and re-designation applicants raise a host of
other policy considerations, any extended discussion of which is beyond the scope of this report.
On one hand, giving priority to transferees would allow an additional recreational user to obtain
a mooring. On the other hand, the priority gives fuels any false sense that the existing mooring
holder is “entitled” to benefits beyond the one year term of his or her residential license.
In summary, Newport, in balancing between commercial and private interests, has tipped
the scale at 3:1 in favor of private users. Newport continued efforts to enforce the differences
between the two types of mooring permits facilitate accuracy in fee assessments and ratio
reporting. In addition to continued enforcement, clarifying the procedure for re-designation from
private to commercial will further Newport‟s goal of achieving commercial: private balance.

VI.

Resident: Non-Resident Ratio
The Newport ordinance requires that residents be given a preference for mooring spaces

over non-residents in a ratio of 3:1. While that is the target ratio, the actual occupancy was
estimated at 1:1 in the Harbor Plan.138 The discrepancy may be attributable to the fact that the
ordinance does not adjust for any changes in residency after the mooring permit is initially
granted. While the mooring holder is required to “notify the harbormaster of any change of
address,” the ordinance does not indicate the significance of such data beyond serving as the
valid contact information for registration renewal.139
One option of enforcing the 3:1 ratio is to require proof of residency upon each renewal
in order for a private resident permittee to retain mooring benefits. Adopting such a policy could
be implemented using an explicit disclaimer that change in residency amounts to forfeiture. It
would also require a system for adding those who lose the residency preference to a waiting list
for non-residents.
The resident preference ratio is consistent with Newport‟s harbor management goals.
Because Newport residents live closer to their moorings, they are more likely to put them to
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optimum use. Therefore, enforcing residency requirements for renewal would further Newport‟s
goal of “achieving maximum sustainable benefits of moorings in Newport harbor,”140 which is
discussed in further in Section VII of this report.
The ratio is also consistent with CRMC limit that the ratio be no greater than 3:1.
However, CRMC has explained that Army Corps rather than state policy applies to moorings
within “federal navigation project” areas.141 In the federal project areas, the “open to all on a fair
and equitable basis” standard applies.142 This creates some potential inconsistency, which would
be resolved should the boundaries of the “federal project areas” be re-designated, as
contemplated in the Harbor Plan.143 Because the applicability of the Corps policy is subject to
change, the remainder of this section focuses on sources of law and policy other than the Corps‟
policies. While all of Newport‟s moorings still remain subject to Corps jurisdiction per the
Rhode Island General Permit, the permit does not contain an express “open to all” condition.144
It is uncertain whether the PTD itself requires following an “open to all” policy. There
are three cases that are related to but far from decisive of the issue. One decision from a federal
district court in Maine invalidated a municipalities denial of a permit to a non-resident when
there was no waiting list.145 Their reasoning was based on the fact that the 10% non-resident
ratio employed should not apply unless it is actually benefiting residents.146 Where there were
no residents vying for mooring space, the municipality could not arbitrarily refuse to grant
permits to non-residents. While not addressing resident preference, the Illinois Supreme Court
faced the related issue of differential fees for residents and non-residents.147 It declined to decide
the case based on the public trust doctrine, however, resorting to the Equal Protection Clause
analysis explored below.148 Finally, New Jersey‟s interpretation of the PTD prohibits preferring
140
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residents over non-residents.149 The New Jersey approach should be considered in light of their
more expansive construction of state public trust law.150 Because of the lack of authorities on
this issue, Rhode Island will charter its own course as it faces legal questions dependent on its
resolution.
Regardless of any Army Corps or PTD issues surrounding the residence preference, the
policy must comport with relevant provisions of the United States Constitution. Other harbor
cities have faced Equal Protection challenges to their resident preference policies. The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents state and local law from irrationally
distinguishing between two groups of people—here the resident and non-resident group.151
Reviewing courts have given great deference to harbor cities, requiring only that the preference
for non-residents serves a legitimate governmental purpose and the use of the ratio to implement
the preference is rationally related to Newport‟s goals.152 This low level judicial scrutiny applies
because “the right of access to mooring privileges is not a fundamental right” under the United
States Constitution.153
There are at least two rational reasons for Newport to prefer its residents over nonresidents. First, as mentioned previously, residents may be more likely to make maximum use of
the moorings throughout the season, which furthers Newport‟s harbor goals.154 Second, city
residents may also legitimately preferred by local governments because they pay state taxes and
contribute to the economy by employment, whereas non-residents do not.155 This second reason
supports both the ratio preference and the fee difference of one hundred dollars.156 The United
149
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States Supreme Court has explained that non-residents can be charged higher fees “based on both
the added enforcement costs and the conservation expenditure supported by resident-borne
taxes.”157 Specifically applying this rationale to mooring fees, the Supreme Court of Illinois
stated that “if the mooring fees charged to both residents and nonresidents were the same, the
residents of the park district would be paying a disproportionate share of the costs of maintaining
the park district‟s services and facilities.”158
Therefore, the resident: non-resident ratio is consistent with the Equal Protection Clause
and with CRMC policy. The preference for residents promotes the goal of increasing mooring
utilization. Requiring proof of residency for renewal of a resident mooring permit would further
promote the utilization goal. Additional methods of increasing utilization are discussed in the
next section (VII).

VII.

Mooring Underutilization
Newport faces the constant challenge of mooring unavailability and delay, as witnessed

by its long waiting lists. The problem is further complicated by mooring underutilization.
Specifically, some people on the waiting list wait over a decade for a mooring, while others
have mooring rights but rarely use them. Commercial moorings tend to be adequately utilized
because the commercial permittee‟s profit depends on maximum utilization. However, it is the
private moorings that are grossly underutilized. While private moorings serve to further
permittee‟s exercise of public trust rights of navigation and fishing, underutilization calls into
question whether or not such rights are actualized. In doing so, underutilized moorings
compromise Newport‟s goal of promoting “maximum sustainable usage of moorings and
anchorages.”159 There are at least five situations leading to mooring underutilization; the
permittee:
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(1) the permittee has an alternative primary port and uses the Newport mooring only as a weekend visitor
(14% of lessees);160
(2) leaves the vessel in dry dock storage or otherwise not on the mooring (17%);161
(3) uses the mooring for a minimal portion of the boating season;162
(4) uses a low-value and unused “decoy vessel” to preserve the license without actual use;163 or
(5) keeps the vessel at a dock, using the mooring only during storms. 164

Finally, moorings may become underused at the expense of the waiting list when private permits
are issued to business entities rather than natural persons. One way this occurs is when the
mooring is registered to a vessel that is owned by a partnership. The Commission addressed this
issue in its March 10, 2011 appeal hearing for a mooring forfeiture. The Newport resident
permit holder decided to move out of state and stopped using the mooring. In order to preserve it
for himself should he choose to return to Newport (which he stated would not be until his
retirement), he transferred the ownership of the registered vessel from himself to a partnership
between himself and a Newport resident. The two partners were not business partners. In fact,
they formed the partnership by a two sentence “Partnership Document” which they submitted as
an un-notarized photo-copy. The partner remaining in Newport already had his own mooring.
Therefore, the partnership enabled avoidance of the waiting list procedure established by
Newport ordinance, preserving the mooring for the non-resident partner for the future, while
leaving a coveted mooring space unused. These kinds of arrangements prevent others who
dutifully complied with the waiting list procedure from achieving a long-awaited permit. Other
municipalities have enacted some protections against such abuses by clarifying that joint
ownership must appear on the original application, preventing adjustments to the business
structure of the permittee that circumvent the goals of the mooring ordinances.165
One approach to increasing maximum mooring utilization is habitual use requirements.
The most stringent implementation of habitual use policy is a “use-or-forfeit” provision. In
160
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Beverly, Massachusetts, for example, a permittee suffers automatic permit revocation if he or she
does not meet the habitual use requirement of 45 days between June 15th and September 15th.166
A less stringent approach is a “use-or-let-use” approach whereby the harbormaster is
given the authority to make unused moorings available to transient boaters. 167 This has been
implemented in Manchester-by-the-Sea, Massachusetts.168 The harbor regulations require that
the registered vessel occupies the mooring for 60 days each season defined between June 1st and
October 1st.169 The permittee is required to notify the harbormaster if he or she does not expect
to meet the habitual use condition.170 Upon notification, the habitual use requirement may be
waived for one year.171 The ordinance only allows for one waiver, however, making future
failure to meet the habitual use requirement grounds for forfeiture.172
While enforcing habitual use requirements is unquestionably difficult, having a habitual
use provision in an ordinance serves at least two purposes. First, the mere presence of the
requirement, despite lack of any enforcement mechanism akin to a parking meter, may compel at
least some permittees to increase their mooring use or to decide to “let use” to avoid the risk of
forfeiture, however slight. Second, a habitual use provision provides a grounds for forfeiture is
cases of the most obvious violations. While the harbormaster could not be expected to count the
mooring days of each boat, the provision gives the city the legal ability to remedy those violators
who have not used the mooring for years.
Under the use-or-let-use approach, if a city decides to offer an under-utilized mooring on
a transient or seasonable basis, it could face added liability. Because the city would be offering
both the space and the mooring equipment to the transient or single-season user, it could be held
responsible for damages associated with those moorings.173 Potential liability may further
obligate the city to take on “providing security patrols, preventing chafing during storms and
166
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assuring the general well-being of the vessel.”174 This is in contrast to Newport‟s liability under
the current mooring regime where it acts only as the “surface manager,” with the permittee
having ownership of, and therefore liability for, any damages associated with that mooring
equipment. 175
Another potential solution is allowing Newport yacht clubs to which a permittee belongs
to offer the mooring through the yacht club in lieu of reciprocity benefits. The Harbor Plan
contemplates this solution: “private permit holders who are members of a yacht club be allowed
to make their mooring available to their yacht club for the sole purpose of the club being able to
offer „yacht club transient guest moorings‟ to other yacht clubs with which they have a
„reciprocal privileges agreement.‟”176 This solution addresses the problem of underuse while
maintaining the prohibition on receiving monetary compensation for use by others. Instead, the
lessee and the yacht club would receive the benefit of reciprocity privileges.
Under the current ordinance, a permittee wishing to make his or her mooring available to
the yacht club face two limiting provisions regulating use by vessels other than the one registered
to the mooring. Newport‟s ordinance allows use by non-registered vessels only if two
requirements are met: (a) the 7/14 day time limit, and (b) prior written request by the mooring
lessee.177 With the guarantee that permittee not receive compensation from the yacht club or the
user, the time limit may prove to be an unnecessary restriction. The second requirement is an
inconvenience that may deter the mooring holder. The option might be more desirable if the
harbormaster was authorized accept a written request from the yacht club, acting as the lessee‟s
agent. Alternatively, the ordinance could specifically address the yacht club scenario, by
requiring only one written request by the lessee to allow for future use by multiple reciprocating
yacht club members. One drawback of the yacht club solution is that its success depends entirely
on the contract agreement between the yacht club and the mooring lessee. If the yacht club
decides it is not economical to assume the additional liability for aiding mooring use, the
moorings will remain underutilized and out of the city‟s control.
174
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Regarding users who are using the mooring only during storms, Newport could inform
them of their other options. The Harbor Plan contemplates establishing a temporary hurricane
anchorage area in Coddington Cove.178 This could reduce the underuse problem for licensees
who have docks available under normal weather conditions. Newport‟s authorizing statute
provides that in addition to its power to site permanent moorings, the city may designate both
temporary mooring or anchorage areas, which supports Newport‟s ability to go forward with this
recommended action.179
While underutilization is a serious problem for Newport, it is not incurable. Newport
may explore habitual use requirements, including use-or-forfeit or use-or-let-use strategies.
Alternatively, Newport may avoid incurring any additional liability by allowing yacht clubs to
offer members‟ moorings for reciprocity benefits. Whichever solution Newport adopts,
maximizing use of existing moorings will greatly improve the mooring system‟s promotion of
public trust uses as well as maintain favorable public perception in the system‟s fairness.

VIII.

Mooring Fee Profit and The Maritime Enterprise Fund
This section explores the how mooring fee profits are managed in Newport‟s Maritime

Enterprise Fund (MEP), with some useful comparisons to fund administration in Newport. This
section also addresses whether profit-making is consistent with the PTD.
The proceeds from mooring fees are deposited into Newport‟s MEP. 180 Enterprise funds
are an accounting mechanism by which a city providing a particular service, like harbor
management, retains control of the revenues the service, rather than dispensing the revenue into
the city‟s general fund. 181 The funds in the MEP cover the Harbor‟s operating expenses, with
any surplus (profits) becoming available for harbor development projects. 182 This fund
management benefit is achieved by separate accounting ledgers but not necessarily by separation
178
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of funds among several bank accounts.183 Enterprise Funds are regarded as a business for
purposes of government accounting practices.
The Army Corps of Engineers also speaks to the revenue rules. The agency objects to
fees that are not a reflection of the cost of administering a mooring area. 184 This no-profit
policy, like the open-to-all policy, is not stated in the conditions for Rhode Island‟s General
Permit for issuing mooring licenses, but may apply in the federal navigation project areas subject
to upcoming change. The question of whether Newport‟s profit practices meet the
proportionality requirement is complicated by the MEP system for two reasons. First, the MEP
combines profits from other harbor fines and fees, the city‟s mooring rentals, and cruise ships.
Second, the funds are used for a variety of costs that are not exclusive to the mooring program:
e.g. paperwork, harbor master duties, harbor staff during peak season.
The proportionality requirement is not universally recognized. While some jurisdictions
hold that the fees must be proportional to the actual cost of implementing the program, many
decisions are based on an applicable state statute setting forth a proportionality standard.185 The
applicable Rhode Island statute for Newport‟s authority to charge mooring fees does not include
any requirement that the fees be proportional to the cost of implementing the program. By
contrast, Massachusetts has adopted proportionality requirement by statute.186 Because of such
difference in state law, the Rhode Island Supreme Court specifically cautioned against confusion,
urging “great caution” when applying out-of-state cases to Rhode Island issues.187
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185
See, e.g. Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass‟n v. Atlantis Beach Club, 851 A.2d 19, 33 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2004). The
distinction between a statutory basis for invalidating fees and a public trust basis for doing so can be confusing.
Raleigh exemplifies this by quoting the state statute right in the middle of a public trust discussion.
186
M.G.L.A. 91 § 10A (West 2011), available at
http://www.malegislature.gov/Laws/GeneralLaws/PartI/TitleXIV/Chapter91/Section10A (“A reasonable fee for
such mooring permit, proportionate to the city or town‟s cost of overseeing mooring permits, may be imposed by
the city or town or whoever is so authorized by the city or town.”)
187
Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. Rhode Island, 657 A.2d 1038, 1042 (R.I. Sup. Ct. 1995), quoting
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 US 1, 26 (1894), available at
http://www.rhodeislandpropertylaw.com/uploads/file/Greater%20Providence%20Chamber%20Case(1).pdf.
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Another problem in trying to apply the proportionality cases is that their underlying
regulatory concern is often with the reasonableness of the fees rather than the fact that the city is
making a profit.188 Therefore, the real determination of validity of the fees under the PTD should
depend on whether the fees are so high that they are unreasonably prohibiting the exercise of
public trust rights for those who cannot pay, not on whether the city is making profits.
Recognizing these distinctions, the Supreme Court of Illinois, after pointing out the fact that its
relevant state statute also lacked any proportionality limit, concluded that nothing in the PTD
itself prevents the city to make profit on mooring fees.189 The court recognized the need for
harbor cities to raise revenues for successful harbor management and upheld profit-producing
mooring fees based on a reasonableness standard.190 Therefore, the real issue is whether the fee
is reasonable in light of an average boat owner‟s ability to pay, rather than in comparison to the
cost of administering the program.
Furthermore, some states that have required proportionality have construed it broadly.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, for example, allows municipalities to calculate beach use fees
based on a wide-range of beach-related costs outside the cost of implementing the specific beach
fee program.191 These include “all additional costs legitimately attributable to the operation and
maintenance of the beachfront.”192 The court gave several examples of what the city could
include in its fee calculation, including all operating and personnel expenses, outstanding debt
related to beach improvement, and annual reserve to cover anticipated expenses relating to beach
improvement.193
While the PTD does not necessarily invalidate Newport‟s collection of profits, it may
impose the requirement that the profits be expended to improve the public trust resource. For
example, the Supreme Florida Court explained that while “the public trust doctrine…does not
prohibit local governments from imposing reasonable user fees for [public trust resource] access,
188

Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 55 (N.J.1972) (“The rationale behind [the statutory
proportionality requirement] certainly is that such municipalities may properly pass on some or all of the financial
burden, as they decide, by imposing reasonable beach user fees”)(emphasis supplied).
189
Broeckl v. Chicago Park Dist., 544 N.E.2d 792, 794 (Ill. 1989). The public trust doctrine applies to navigable
lakes. See, e.g. Nat‟l Audubon Soc‟y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983)
(discussing the “public trust doctrine which, after evolving as a shield for the protection of tidelands, now extends its
protective scope to navigable lakes”).
190
Id.
191
Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 55 (N.J. 1972).
192
Id.
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so long as the revenue is expended solely for the protection and welfare of the public using that
[public trust resource], as well as for improvements that will enhance the public‟s use of the
sovereign property” (emphasis supplied).194 Fortunately, that is exactly what the MEP
facilitates. The MEP is designed to ensure that the profits from mooring fees are expended in
ways that improve the Harbor. Because the MEP is used to keep profits for use of the public
beneficiaries of the public trust doctrine, the MEP might be likened to a trust account. Similar to
Newport‟s MEP, San Diego‟s harbor fund has been said to “constitute a trust fund for the
furtherance of navigation and commerce, in which were to be placed all revenues derived from
tideland leases and franchises, and other income from harbor improvements, to be devoted to the
purposes of the trust.”195
While the MEP is generally administered consistent with this trust responsibility, there
seem to be two exceptions to the requirement that funds in the MEP be used for harbor
management and development. First, the Newport Department of Economic Development has
the ability to draw from the MEP for indirect costs, in order to fund either harbor-related
expenses196 (e.g. seawalls) or municipal costs that cannot be attributed to use by a single
enterprise197 (e.g. city solicitor). There is no corollary benefit assuring that other funds would
reimburse the Harbor Fund for its use of harbor services.198 For example, the harbormaster
responds to incidents at piers, docks, and marinas without any compensation from the General
Fund. The General Fund receives tax revenues from the marinas, with the tax-payers receiving
the benefit of the harbormaster‟s Services. Second, undercapitalized funds may be able to
“borrow” from other funds.199 The latter aspect is vested in the authority of the Department of
Economic Development.200
193

Id.
City of Daytona Beach Shores v. State, 483 So.2d 405, 408 (Fla. 1986).
195
Atwood v. Hammond, 48 P.2d 20, 27 (Cal. 1935), available at
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1377038613279570502&q=48+P.2d+20&hl=en&as_sdt=2,40.
196
See City of Newport Waterfront Commission, Meeting Minutes of November 13, 2008 (Notes based on
presentation from Laura Sitrin, Director, City of Newport Finance Department).
197
Massachusetts Department of Revenue, Division of Local Services, Bureau of Accounts, Informational Guideline
Release 08-101, Enterprise Funds G.L. c. 44, § 53F ½,7 (April 2008).
198
Personal Communication with Hank Kniskern, March 7, 2010.
199
See City of Newport Waterfront Commission, Meeting Minutes, November 13, 2008 (Notes based on
presentation from Laura Sitrin, Director, City of Newport Finance Department).
200
Id.
194
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In contrast to the administration of the MEP, enterprise funds under Massachusetts law
are administered in accordance with a codified comprehensive scheme for municipal enterprise
funds.201 This system replaced the state‟s old system of diverse acts for each proposed fund.202
The statute also expanded the municipalities‟ flexibility in administering their funds, authorizing
indirect costs, capital improvements, and fixed assets. Pursuant to the statute, cities or town can
create an enterprise fund by vote of the city‟s legislative branch (e.g. the City Council).203 The
Enterprise Fund annual budget must be approved by the city‟s executive branch is then subject to
approval by the city‟s executive branch (e.g. the Governor) and the legislative branch.204 The
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which also has jurisdiction over federal
Rhode Island case, favorably cited to the Waterways Management Enterprise Fund established
by the City of Dartmouth.205 After explaining “the fund is financed by a waterways use fee,” the
court applied the benefits of enterprise fund management system to its analysis of a claim that
the user fees were unreasonable.206 The appeals court held that the fees were reasonable in part
because they were being used solely for waterway-related expenses.207
Like Newport‟s MEP, Massachusetts has also faced some of the problems associated
with allocation of indirect costs not attributable to one single city enterprise. The Massachusetts
Bureau of Accounts recommends that “every community with an enterprise fund establish a
written, internal policy regarding indirect cost allocation,” to be reviewed annually.208
The MEP serves as an effective means of ensuring that mooring profits are used for other
public trust purposes in the harbor. This benefit to the public trust resource and the
reasonableness of the fees for paying boat owners are evidence of the fees‟ compliance with the
PTD.
201

Massachusetts Department of Revenue, Division of Local Services, Bureau of Accounts, Informational Guideline
Release 08-101, Enterprise Funds G.L. c. 44, § 53F ½, pg. 2(April 2008).
202
Id.
203
Id., providing sample language for an enterprise fund adoption vote: “To see if the (city or town) will accept the
provisions of Chapter 44, § 53F½ of the Massachusetts General Laws establishing (the service) as an enterprise fund
effective fiscal year (year)”)(parentheticals in original).
204
Id.
205
LCM Enterprises v. Dartmouth, 14 F.3d 675, 684 (1st Circ. 1994), available at
http://openjurist.org/14/f3d/675/lcm-enterprises-inc-v-town-of-dartmouth.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Massachusetts Department of Revenue, Division of Local Services, Bureau of Accounts, Informational Guideline
Release 08-101, Enterprise Funds G.L. c. 44, § 53F ½, pg. 7 (April 2008).
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IX.

Conclusion
The legal and policy issues facing Newport as it revises and implements its ordinances

are numerous. Most of the issues have not been squarely resolved for Rhode Island. While
Newport may take guidance from other states, it will be Rhode Island‟s task going forward to
define the reach of its PTD as applied to some novel issues raised by mooring administration.
The benefit of the flexibility of the PTD is allowing smaller units of government like Newport to
define their regulatory goals based on a locally-tailored balancing test of competing interests
facing scare ocean resources. This report was designed to facilitate decision-maker discussion of
how to strike that delicate balance.
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Appendix A: Reference Guide for Comparing Other Municipalities’ Ordinances
RHODE ISLAND
Barrington
Bristol

HARBOR PLAN LINK
http://72.46.3.26/harbor/HarborMgt
Plan01-05-09complete.pdf
http://www.bristolri.us/harbor/harbo
rmgmtplan.php

Jamestown
Narragansett

http://narragansettri.gov/admin/Do
cumentView.aspx?DID=416&DL=1

Newport

http://www.cityofnewport.com/depa
rtments/economicdevelopment/harbor/pdf/HMP_012010.pdf
http://www.northkingstown.org/site
s/northkingstown.org/files/pdfattachments/harbor_management
_plan_2007.pdf

North Kingstown

Providence
South Kingstown
Tiverton
Warren

Warwick

MASSACHUSETTS
Barnstable

http://www.townofwarrenri.gov/images/Harbor_Managemen
t_Plan_Updated_Jan_2010.pdf
http://www.warwickri.gov/pdfs/plan
ning/Harbor%20Management%20
Plan.pdf
HMP LINK

Beverly

Bourne
Chatham

http://www.town.chatham.ma.us/P
ublic_Documents/ChathamMA_Co
astal/tocscpdocs

Cohasset
Duxbury

http://www.town.duxbury.ma.us/pu
blic_documents/DuxburyMA_BCo
mm/BayManagementplanJune200
5.pdf

Eastham

Falmouth
Gloucester

Hingham

http://www.uhi.umb.edu/pdf_files/d
raft_green_pond_aug_20_09.pdf
http://www.uhi.umb.edu/pdf_files/C
ity%20of%20Gloucester%20Harbo
r%20Plan%20July%202009.pdf
http://www.hinghamma.gov/document/Harbor_Master_
Plan_Report.pdf

ORDINANCES LINK

http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=10105&sta
teId=39&stateName=Rhode%20Island
http://www.jamestownri.net/harbor/HMO/Harbor_Ordinanc
e_2004.pdf
http://library4.municode.com:80/defaultnow/template.htm?view=browse&doc_action=setdoc&doc_
keytype=tocid&doc_key=46385008ec6f4f2d7bea6a7aa1c1
a451&infobase=11204

http://library4.municode.com:80/defaulttest/template.htm?view=browse&doc_action=setdoc&doc_
keytype=tocid&doc_key=753045e315ba7ccc272bb4e126a
6fae8&infobase=11995
http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=11458&sta
teId=39&stateName=Rhode%20Island
http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=14928&sta
teId=39&stateName=Rhode%20Island
http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=12864&sta
teId=39&stateName=Rhode%20Island

http://www.warwickri.gov/pdfs/officialdocs/CH024%20%20Chapter%2024%20%20HARBORS.pdf

ORDINANCE LINK
http://www.town.barnstable.ma.us/HarborMaster/Mooring%
20Regulations.pdf
http://www.harbormasters.org/cgibin/search/proxy.cgi?terms=mooring&url=http%3A%2F%2
Fwww.harbormasters.org%2Fbeverly%2Fmoorreg.htm
http://www.townofbourne.com/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=XO
aIPoDVgek%3D&tabid=157&mid=819
http://www.chathamma.gov/Public_Documents/ChathamMA_Harbor/regulation
s/MOORINGREGS2008.pdf
http://www.townofcohasset.org/harbormaster/harbor_rules
_regs.pdf
http://www.duxburyharbormaster.org/Mooringrules.htm

http://www.easthamma.gov/Public_Documents/EasthamMA_Resources/moori
ng%20regulations%20abstract%202008.pdf
http://www.falmouthmass.us/depart.php?depkey=harbor

http://www.hingham-ma.gov/harbormaster/bylaw.html
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Hull

http://www.town.hull.ma.us/Public_
Documents/HullMA_HarborManag
eCom/Harbor%20Management%2
0Plan.pdf

Ipswich
Lynn

http://www.ipswichpolice.org/Files/MOORING%20REGUL
ATIONS%202011.pdf
http://ediclynn.org/misc/Final%20M
HP%20Document.pdf

Manchester by the Sea
Marblehead
Marshfield
Nantucket

New Bedford

http://www.uhi.umb.edu/pdf_files/N
antucket_Madaket_Harbors_Actio
n_Plan_2009.pdf
http://www.newbedfordma.gov/PortofNewBedford/hdc/Fin
al%20complete%207-1509%20(web%20version).pdf

Plymouth
Province Town

http://www.uhi.umb.edu/pdf_files/p
rovincetown.pdf

http://www.uhi.umb.edu/pdf_files/R
ockport_Harbor_Plan.pdf

Salem

Salisbury

Sandwich
Scituate
Winthrop

http://www.newbedfordma.gov/PortofNewBedford/hdc/Mooring%20Regulations%
20NB.pdf
http://www.nantucketma.gov/pages/nantucketma_marine/harborregs.pdf

Quincy
Rockport

http://www.manchester.ma.us/Pages/manchesterma_harb
or/Regs.pdf
http://www.marblehead.org/DocumentView.aspx?DID=249
1
http://www.townofmarshfield.org/public_documents/marshfi
eldma_harbor/MarshfieldmooringSkiffregulations.pdf
http://www.nantucketma.gov/pages/nantucketma_marine/harborregs.pdf

http://www.quincyma.gov/CityOfQuincy_Content/document
s/MooringRegs2007.pdf
http://www.harbormasters.org/rockport/mooring.shtml
http://www.salem.com/pages/salemma_dpcd/studiesrephtt
p://www.salem.com/pages/salemma_dpcd/studiesreports/2
008%20salem%20Harbor%20plan.pdf

http://www.uhi.umb.edu/pdf_files/S
alisbury_Management_Plan_Oct0
8.pdf
http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=11521&sta
teId=21&stateName=Massachusetts
http://www.town.scituate.ma.us/harbormaster/mooringregs.
html
http://www.town.winthrop.ma.us/pages/WinthropMA_Harbo
r/rules_regs
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